SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR
HART'S LEGAL SYSTEM-A REPLY
TO PROFESSOR SUMMERS
PHILIP MULLOCK*

In a recent issue, this journal published an article by Professor Robert
S. Summers reviewing and commenting critically upon a recent book by
ProfessorH. L. A. Hart of Oxford entitled The Concept of Law. Among
other things, Professor Summers criticized Professor Hart for stressing
rules to the neglect of other elements of a legal system and for succumbing to reductionist tendencies in the analysis of such basic concepts
as "courts" and "legislatures."

D

ESPITE what some critics have said, the spate of reviews and
comments it has provoked bears ample witness to the fact that
there has been nothing quite like Professor H. L. A. Hart's The
Concept of Law in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Professor Summers' recent contribution to the dialogue, indicates
that he is both a faithful reviewer and a constructive critic. In this
article I propose to do three things. First, I shall attempt to show
that Professor Summers' criticism of Professor Hart's idea of a union
of rules and his allegation of reductionism can be accommodated
within the structure of Professor Hart's legal philosophy. Secondly,
I shall consider the implications of Professor Summers' suggestion
that Professor Hart's theory needs criteria, not only for recognizing
the rules of a legal system but also for identifying the legal system
itself. Finally, I shall discuss the connection, if any, between
Professor Hart's concept of validity and his theory of a minimum
natural law.
* J.D. 1958, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1959, University of Virginia. Member,
Virginia Bar. Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University.
On the subject of modem mathematics, I have benefited from discussions with Professor Sherwood Ebey of the Mercer University faculty; he should not, however, be held
responsible for anything I have said.
2Summers, Professor H. L. A. Hart's Concept of Law, 1963 DuKE L.J. 629.
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II
A. Union of Rules
Professor Summers is not alone 2 in his contention that Professor
3
Hart claims too much for his union of primary and secondary rules.
However, he goes further than most critics and adds that Professor
Hart does not in fact use a combination of primary and secondary
rules to elucidate any specific legal concept. At most, according to
Professor Summers, he has succeeded merely in furnishing a criterion
for differentiating the primitive and static society (primary rules
only) from the modern dynamic state, i.e., the union of rules is
relevant only to the elucidation of the general concept, the "legal
system."' 4 Such an assertion, however, fails to do justice to a major
part of the point Professor Hart is making, because it does not take
into account the basis upon which this part of Professor Hart's
theory rests, and which, in my opinion, is to be found mainly in
Kelsen.
It is impossible, says Kelsen, to understand the nature of law by
looking at a rule in isolation. 5 Many words cannot be understood
except in reference to a system; for instance, to understand the words
"baseball bat," we must refer to the system of baseball. Similarly,
the legal quality of a legal rule is not to be perceived by gazing
at it, for there cannot be a system of isolated rules. Kelsen also
remarks that law regulates its own creation; 6 in other words, it takes
rules to make law. But what about the rules themselves? What
does it mean to say that a rule exists? Is merely convergent,
habitual behavior sufficient? If not, how do we distinguish such
behavior (people go to the cinema on Saturday evening) from
a social rule (men bare their heads on entering church)? Professor Hart explains the difference in this way. If one does not
go to the cinema on Saturday evening, no one will care one way
or the other. If, however, a man does not bare his head upon entering church, he will be met with hostile reactions. The distinguishing feature of a social rule, therefore, is that deviations from the rule
will give rise to criticisms and reproofs which are considered
See, e.g., Cohen, Book Review, 71 MiND 395 (1962).
3 Summers, supra note 1,at 639.
'Id. at 639 n.16.
KELSN, GENERAL THEORY oF LWv AND STATE 3 (1945 ed.) [hereinafter cited as

2

KELsEN].
OId.

at 132.
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justified by those deviations. This fact finds its linguistic expression
in certain normative words like should, ought, and must, which
function as indicia of the presence of rules requiring certain
conduct.1 Legal rules in turn are a subspecies of social rules and
fall into three broad categories:" primary rules which impose duties,
secondary rules which confer powers of adjudication and change,
and rules of recognition which specify criteria for identifying the
rules of the system.9 The union of these three types of rules, the
fact that it takes rules to make law, is what, for Professor Hart, lies
at the center of a legal system and illuminates many of the perplexing
0
problems of jurisprudence.
In commenting on Austin's theory that law is a system of orders
backed by threats, Kelsen points out that when the gunman orders
a bank clerk, "Hand over the money or I will shoot," he is not giving
a binding order because bindingess implies that there is a rule
which confers authority upon the person who gives the order.11
Therefore, even though the notion of orders backed by threats may
in some cases cofivey the force of what we mean by law, it cannot
be regarded as a definition of law. One significance, then, of Professor Hart's idea of a union of rules is that an important element in
the analysis of concepts developed by theorists in talking about law
is an implied reference to an unstated rule forming part of a system
of rules. "Union" in this sense is certainly not a simple one-to-one
combination in that we may, for example, add one primary rule to
one secondary rule to-get X, some legal concept.
Professor Summers asserts that in elucidating the concept of
validity, Professor Hart uses the notion of a rule of recognition
rather than a union of rules.12 But what else could he use, and what
more is necessary? When judge, attorney, and citizen state, "The
rule that a will must be attested by two witnesses is valid in England,"
they are, according to Professor Hart, making internal statements,
i.e., from the point of view of those living in a society in which the
various transactions of life are conducted according to rules. They
7

HART, Tim CONcEpT oF LAw 54-56 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART].
8 Although Professor Hart uses the expression "secondary rules of recognition," HART
95, he does not now, if he ever really did, regard rules of recognition as secondary rules.
Rather than conferring powers upon anyone, these rules merely set out the tests for
validity, i.e., the criteria for identifying what are to count as rules of the legal system.
9 HART 89-96.
'Old. at 96.
11

2 ELSUEN
31-32.
12 Summers, supra note 1, at 639.
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all are making the statement intra system, as contrasted with an
external statement made by an observer who, without accepting the
rule himself, may assert that it is accepted in the society in question.
Just as it is the internal (normative) aspect of rules as contrasted with
merely convergent, habitual behavior which interests Professor Hart,
so it is the internal need to identify which rules are to count as
legal rules that is important to Professor Hart here. When judge,
attorney, and citizen make the statement, "The rule that a will must
be attested by two witnesses is valid in England," the function of
the word "valid" in that statement is to make a reference to an
unstated but accepted rule of recognition which specifies criteria for
identifying the rules of the system. Insofar as Professor Hart's theory
is concerned, this ends the matter. Analysis of a legal concept other
than validity, however, will bring out that it presupposes a ruledetermined setting in which legal rules must be marshalled to
support whatever is asserted in statements using such a concept.
But when the concept in question is validity itself, any such addition
would be superfluous because all that is needed, in Professor Hart's
theory, is the notion of a rule of recognition; validity has syntactical
meaning only. In discussing oblig-tion, 13 Professor Hart points
outO4 that while Bentham's analysis of legal duty in terms of likelihood
of suffering for doing or not doing X no doubt reflects the force of
the notion in certain contexts, it ignores the important point that
the relation of pain to previous conduct must also be justified by
rules. Legal duty is tied to the idea that if an obligatory act is
not done, there will be a case under legal rules for applying sanctions.
Hence any reference to legal duty presupposes a normative or ruledetermined setting and that there is a definable pattern of conduct,
deviation from which should be held under legal rules to justify
things being done to a person which otherwise would be resented
and wrong under the system of rules. Bentham's omission of this
setting is what, for Professor Hart, vitiates his theory. Again, in
commenting on Hohfeld's four correlative senses of individual
rights, Professor Hart suggests that most of the defects could be
remedied by inserting as the central point the idea of an individual
whose choice regarding whether to act or not to act is assisted rather
- Professor Summers also states that Hart "uses only the notion of a 'primary rule'
to elucidate the concept of obligation." Ibid.

11 HART 81-83.
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than impeded by legal rules.1 5 The ascription of a legal right to A is
a statement of law, so that legal rules must be marshalled in support
of it; and any reference to legal rules implies a reference also to an
unstated rule for recognizing the rules of the system.
When Kelsen leads us up (down?) the hierarchy of norms, 10
Professor Hart follows,' 7 stopping only when Kelsen takes the final
step up (down?) to his basic norm. Both agree that it takes rules
to make law. Professor Hart differs from Kelsen, however, in that
he does not see why we must also postulate the validity of a basic
norm which says that people ought to obey the historically first constitution. For Professor Hart, the historically first constitution is
simply a matter of empirical fact - internal (intrasystem) acceptance
- which is observable externally.18 In the modern society, rules
of change and adjudication correct the static nature of a system containing primary'rules only; rules of recognition enable us to identify
the rules of the system.' The word "law," when used in discourse
about a modem society, implies a system having at least these three
categories of rules ivhich are necessary to keep it going in a dynamic
fashion. When we develop concepts such as right and duty in talking about law, we cannot elucidate them properly without bringing
into our analysis a reference to rules forming a part of a system
of rules. This, I think, is the point of Professor Hart's union of
rules, which to me seems to be a development of Kelsen's insight
that law regulates its own creation. Just as Kelsen points out that
the legal quality of a legal rule cannot be understood except by
reference to a legal system, so for Professor Hart, the nature of a
legal system cannot be perceived without an awareness that there
can be no satisfactory analysis of the concepts developed by theorists
in talking about law which does not recognize that in using those
concepts, we are talking about some aspect of a system of rules.
B. Reductionism
Professor Summers asks the following questions, the implication
being that Professor Hart is trying to do what in each case is questioned:
HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1953).
26 KELSEN 115-16.
2r

17 HART 103-04.
18

Id. at 106-07.
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1. Can laws be reduced to rules?19
20
2. Can rules be reduced to two classes?
21
3. Can secondary rules be reduced to three types?
4. Can the various criteria for identifying valid rules be reduced
to a rule of recognition?2
23
5. Can courts be reduced to rules?
24
6. Can legislatures be reduced to rules?
Questions 2 and 3 are simply about classification, which surely is a
philosophically harmless activity; the ability to see "the one in the
many" should not be dismissed as reductionism. The answer to
question 4 is that they cannot because they are not. As I shall
indicate later, the criteria of identification need not be embodied
in a rule at all; so far as I am aware, the Queen in Parliament has
not enacted a rule to the effect that "In England only those rules
enacted by the Queen in Parliament shall be recognized as legal
rules." If such a rule has been enacted, then it is simply a legal
rule. But this is not to say that the criterion bf identification has
been reduced to anything; it remains a criterion as long as it is
accepted as such. Questions 5 and 6 possibly could involve reductionism, but to say that rules lie behind these institutions2 5 is not to
reduce them to rules. It is difficult to see how Professor Summers
can say that Professor Hart has shifted from a concept of law which
required courts and a legislature to one which requires only rules26
merely because he now emphasizes a union of rules. His secondary
rules of change still need a legislature, and the secondary rules of
adjudication need both a legislature and courts. Professor Hart
never suggests that he has reduced either the legislature to rules
of change or the courts to rules of adjudication. Insofar as orders
which have the force of law are concerned, Professor Hart can
explain them simply by pointing out that they derive their legal
force from rules. Otherwise, as Kelsen observed, the gunman's
order would be entitled to the same respect as that of the judge.2 T
Summers, supra note 1, at 640.
20 Id. at 641.
21
Id. at 642.
52
Ibid.
MId. at 643.
24
Ibid.
19

'5 Ibid.
"Id. at 643-44.
T

' KEtsEN 31-32.
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With respect to question 1, I have difficulty in understanding what
Professor Summers is getting at, for in a footnote 28 he adds that
he does not mean to imply that Professor Hart says that laws can be
reduced to rules. This question is linked by Professor Summers
to the question, "Are principles rules?" Having cited Bishop
Butler's well-known dictum, Professor Summers concludes, "Perhaps law is law, and not another thing."29 Perhaps, however, he
should say that principles are principles but that they may be
reflected in legal rules. Surely all we need say is that when we
talk about "laws," we mean not only legal rules, but also all those
things which derive their legal force from legal rules. Standards,
principles, regulations, and orders may not be legal rules, but any
legal force they have must be derived from legal rules.
III
Professor Summers seems to imply that in addition to criteria for
determining the existence of the rules of a legal system, Professor
Hart also needs to specify criteria for determining the existence of
the legal system itself.3 0 Furthermore, his emphasis on the alleged
reductionism 3' indicates that Professor Summers regards Professor
Hart's legal system as no more than the aggregate of legal rules.
Although the latter would include rules of recognition embodying
the system's criteria of identification, it would not include the
criteria thdmselves. For example, assume the criterion of validity
in England is to be "enacted by the Queen in Parliament." This
is not a rule at all. A rule embodying this criterion might be: "In
England only those rules enacted by the Queen in Parliament shall
be recognized as legal rules." This would be a legal rule, a member
of the class of legal rules; more precisely it would be a rule of recognition. Even though self-referring, its self-reference is syntactical and
therefore harmless. The criterion itself, however, is not a rule at all;
it is simply a criterion.
It must be remembered that we are dealing not with a class but
with a system, a system made up at least of legal rules plus the criterion or criteria of identification. Let us use the symbols L, R, and
28 Summers, supra note 1, at 640 n.19.

29Id. at 641. The dictum referred to in the text is "Everything is what it is, and
not another thing."
80Id. at 647.

slid. at 640-44.
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C to designate the legal system, the class of legal rules, and the criterion of identification respectively. If we now specify C' as a
criterion of identification for L, we cannot accommodate C' within
L, for it is neither C nor a member of R. And if R plus C constitute
L, then L plus C' will make up another system L', ad infinitum. Of
course, we do not have an infinity of legal systems. In fact there
could be just one legal system in the world, even though not the
legal system of a world state. On the other hand, we do have a
multiplicity of legal systems. It is possible, as Kelsen argues, 8 2 that
all positive municipal legal systems are members of a positive international legal system, in which case the criterion for identifying
positive municipal legal systems would be part of the international
legal system also. Moreover, it might be argued that just as the
notion of a legal rule cannot be grasped simply by looking at it,
so the concept of a legal system cannot be understood except by
reference to an international system of municipal legal systems.
This may be Kelsen's viewpoint, but it overlooks the fact that we
may want to and in fact do talk about a, the, our, and your legal
system from different points of view, e.g., that of the lawyer and
that of the political scientist. From the point of v iew of the lawyer,
and therefore of the legal theorist, there is an internal need to talk
about the or our legal system in a way which makes any reference
to international law and a multiplicity of municipal legal systems
quite irrelevant. The elucidation of the notions of right and duty,
the explanation of what it means to say that I pay my taxes to the
same state as did my grandfather, can be dealt with from the standpoint of legal theory within the framework of an analysis of a legal
system or a state. In other words, analysis of the notion of a legal
system and the concepts used in talking about law requires only
that what is latent and implicit be made patent and explicit; the
objective is clarification. We may, of course, differ in our analyses.
However, if we are analyzing the jurisprudential notion of a legal
system, we cannot bring into the analysis something which in fact
is not contained in the analysandum because that would not be
doing analysis, and Professor Hart is doing analysis. Therefore, if
Professor Summers wants Professor Hart to specify criteria for the
existence of a legal system, he is asking Professor Hart to do something other than analytical jurisprudence, for such criteria, as has
32 KEREN

219-20, 363-88.
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been indicated, are not to be found within the concept "a legal
system."
IV
The expression "legal system," like "right" and "duty," is not a
ground floor term of law; rather, it is a concept developed by theorists
in talking about law. Next to the word "universe," "system" is
probably the broadest and loosest collective noun we use, and it is
certainly less precise than those admittedly ambiguous terms, "class"
and "set." The idea of a system has received its most sophisticated
development in modern mathematics. Hence, since the relationship
between Professor Hart's concept of validity and his theory of a minimum natural law must be sought within his concept of a legal
system, it may be profitable to consider briefly the mathematician's
idea of a system in the hope that useful analogies may be drawn. A
modem mathematical system might be conceived of as being composed of classes within classes somewhat in the way a system of concentric circles contains circles within circles.38 The largest class, which
enters into all other smaller classes, consists of all strings of symbols alphabet, punctuation and connectives-used in the system. Next,
in descending order, is the class of well-formed formulae, i.e., those
finite arrangements of symbols of which true or false can be predicated. This is followed by the class of theorems, those well-formed
formulae which are deduced from the smallest class of the system,
axioms, by the system's rules of inference and which can only be
true.3 4 G6del has shown 35 that in any arithmetical system P, it is
3 It is interesting to note that in his introduction to Austin's PROVINCE, Professor
Hart states that "A legal system is a system of rules within rules." Hart, Introduction
to AusTiN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED at xii (library of ideas ed.
1954).
84
P might be represented as follows:

)

35

rule

ol infernce

G8DEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS (Meltzer transl. 1962). See also
DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 712-24 (1962); NACEL & NEWMAN,
GUDEL's PROOF (1959).

W. & M. KNEALE, THE
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possible to construct a theorem G (which is therefore a well-formed
formula also) representing the metamathematical statement "The
formula G is not demonstrable" which cannot be deduced from the
axioms of the system by its rules of inference, although as a theorem,
G must be true unless P is self-contradictory. In effect the theorem
says it is unprovable. If we try to remove this defect by adding
G as a new axiom, then G becomes provable in the trivial sense that
an axiom may be said to be provable because it follows from itself.
But this will be so only within a new system P1, and this in turn
can be shown to be incomplete by the construction of a new Gi5del
theorem, say G1, ad infinitum. Gdel's argument proves not
only that P is incomplete but also that it is incompletable. Although G is, of course, self-referring, its self-reference is syntactical
rather than semantical, and therefore it is harmless. It is neither
faulty in the same way as the pseudo-statement "What I am saying
is false" nor empty like the remark "What I am now saying is true."
To say of theorem G that it is well-formed means no more than
that it is a meaningful arrangement of symbols; it is a form or pattern
of which true or false can be predicated. The rules which enable
us to say of G both that it is a well-formed formula and a theorem
are syntactical (as opposed to semantical) rules for the use of symbols, i.e., rules about their relation with each other as opposed to
their relation to the world. There is nothing to prevent a statement
from referring to its own pattern or form. If I say, "The statement
I am now uttering contains nine words," this is not only free
from paradox but it is also true.3 6
Let us now see what analogies can be drawn in legal theory by
using L as the legal analogue of P. Some natural law theorists think
of a positive legal system L as a system of rules logically deduced
from self-evidently binding axioms. Legal rules in this case
would be analogous to the theorems of P rather than well-formed
formulae, although as theorems they would, of course, be wellformed formulae. Both "Thou shalt kill" and "Thou shalt not
kill" would be analogous to well-formed formulae, but only the
latter would be both a well-formed formula and a theorem, i.e., a
valid legal rule. It would also theoretically be possible to construct
a rule G which would be a legal rule and true and which yet
35 Professor

Alf Ross would disagree, I think, for he has stated that "A proposition

cannot refer to itself." Ross, ON LAW AND JusTIcF 81

(1958).
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could not be derived from the axioms of the system. What, if anything, the natural law theorist can or should do about this is not
my present concern. The legal positivist, on the other hand, would
deny any place in L for the natural law theorist's 4xioms; legal rules
would simply be analogous to well-formed formulae and could
therefore be good or bad. Both "Thou shalt kill" and "Thou shalt
not kill" would be valid legal rules analogous to well-formed formulae. This, however, could hardly satisfy Professor Hart because it
ignores his minimum natural law which I shall now outline to see if
analogies from modern mathematics can help in establishing its
relation to his concept of validity.
Starting with survival as the end of human activity, the goal
desired by all men, Professor Hart argues3 7 to certain necessary social
rules for the protection of persons, property, and promises which
form the minimum content of natural law and which are common
to law and morality. These are the rules of conduct which any
social organization must contain if it is to be viable and which are
necessitated by certain truisms about human beings and the world
in which they live. In other words, assuming survival as an end
and knowing what we know about human beings and their world,
certain social rules become a matter of necessity. This does not
mean, says Professor Hart, that the truisms, the natural facts of
social life, are necessary causal conditions for the social rules in
question; they are simply reasons why the rules are necessary. The
rules, therefore, are not inductive generalizations established scientifically from sociological or psychological experiment and observation, although conceivably they might be so established. At the same
time, Professor Hart avoids any charge of absolutism or dogmatism
by insisting that survival, the natural fact of life, and the related
truisms, the natural facts of social life, are contingently true only;
conceivably things could be otherwise than they are. What emerges
is thus a theory which purports to be empirical rather than metaphysical about a natural law which states contingent rather than
absolute truths and which is established rationally rather than scientifically-a formidable achievement indeed.
It is obvious, I think, that Professor Hart's legal system L must
contain rules satisfying both his criterion of validity (e.g., enacted
by the Queen in Parliament) and his minimum natural law. The
a' HART

189-95.
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former may be said to be formal or syntactical, the latter material or
semantical; and their relationship may be explained in the following
manner. Let the symbol A designate the class of all possibly valid
legal rules, i.e., the class of all rules satisfying the criterion of identification C1 (e.g., enacted by the Queen in Parliament), and let L
designate the subclass of aU valid legal rules, namely those members of
A which also satisfy a second criterion

C2 .

But what is

C2

and how

does a legal rule'in class A gain admittance into class L? The answer
may be as follows. Let x be any member of A, and let a,, a2, and a3
be those valid legal rules constituting Professor Hart's minimum
natural law which will therefore be members of L. Then for each
x in A, we can decide whether a certain relationship expressed in
xRal, xRa2, and xRa3 holds, the relation R being C2 ; for an x to be
in L, we must be able to say of xRal, xRa2, and xRa3 that each is
true.8

This relation R, and therefore C2 , must be the relation of

being "not inconsistent with minimum natural law." The connection between C' and C2, therefore, lies in the fact that for an x
to be in L, it must satisfy both C' and C2 ; both must be satisfied if
a rule is to be a valid rule of positive law. But what about a,, a2 ,
and a. themselves? How do they get into L in the first place? They
are certainly not axioms, because nothing is deduced from them.
Nor are they theorems, for they are not deduced from anything.
Rather, they are in L by "natural necessity," by which Professor
Hart means that there are contingently true social facts which justify
enacting rules with a certain material content. Once they have
been enacted, we can enact any other legal rule not inconsistent with
a,, a2, and a3. Thus, to say of a legal rule that it is valid means that
88

A

L

For x to get from A to L, we must be able to say
xRa1
xRa.
xRa.
is true.
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it satisfies the criterion of identification (C') and is not inconsistent
with the hard core of minimum natural law (C2).
We can now consider the status of "dead letter" laws. Doubtless,
there may be, as Professor Summers suggests,3 9 no point in a legal
realist saying that a rule exists if it is persistently disregarded; there
is, however, every reason for Professor Hart so to hold. Such a
situation would arise because officials disregarded infractions or
were unaware of them. Undoubtedly the rule will have lost its
normativeness; and as a social rule, it could be said to have been
abandoned. However, assuming that the legal system's criterion of
identification is still accepted as such and that the rule is not inconsistent with minimum natural law, its social abandonment will
not destroy its legal validity. Only the enactment of another valid
rule of the system can cancel the validity of such a "dead letter" law.
Part of the meaning of the expression "legal rule" in statements of
the form "It is a legal rule that p" is that the rule in question
satisfies the dual criteria of validity; at the level of meaning there
can be no exceptions. On the other hand, if the rule in question is
one of the minimum natural law rules, its total disregard would
mean for Professor Hart that the legal system had collapsed.
There remains the notion of justice which, for Professor Hart, is
mainly a matter of how the rules are administered. 40 All that justice
requires us to say is that like cases be treated alike, while recognizing
that the criteria for determining when, for any given purpose, cases
are alike, will vary. This will apply to all legal rules, whether they
are morally good or bad. Even an iniquitous law, says Professor
Hart, will be justly administered if only persons genuinely guilty of
breaking the law are punished under it and then only after a fair
trial. However, such a law would have to pertain to the area of
morality outside minimum natural law; for if it were inconsistent
with minimum natural law, it could not be a valid legal rule in the
first place. Presumably minimum natural law does not embrace the
whole of morality.
V
I stated earlier that Professor Hart was doing analysis and therefore that his analysis of a legal system could not be expected to reveal
:0 Summers, supra note 1, at 648.

,oHAir 153-63; Hart, Introduction to PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUsTICn AND THE
PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT

(1963); Hart, Justice, 28

PHILOSOPHY 348

(1953).

Vol. 1965: 62]

HART'S LEGAL SYSTEM

75

more than was contained in the analysandum. Insofar as the syntactical or formal meaning of validity is concerned, it is difficult to
see any rational basis for differing with him, although we may, of
course, disagree regarding those aspects of the semanatical meaning
of law in relation to the world which are most deserving of attention.
Because Professor Hart has chosen the relation of law and morals,
it does not follow that he has excluded everything else. Let us hope,
therefore, that he will see fit to enlighten us further.

